Abstract. To be widely accepted, smart cards must contain completely trustworthy software. Because smart cards contain relatively simple computers, and are used only for a speci c class of applications, it is feasible to make the language used to program the software components focussed and tiny. Formal methods can be used to precisely specify this language and to reason about properties of the language, which results in more trustworthy software. We explore this process by specifying the core of a proprietary systems programming language for smart card operating systems. We show how the speci cation obtained is used in proofs, and in the development of tool support.
Introduction
The ITSEC requirements 8] state that formal methods must be used in the construction of IT systems that are to be endowed with maximal trust. The term Formal Methods describes a mode of operation in the design, speci cation and implementation of a system which is characterised by the application of formalised methods of reasoning. Formal methods: { Help to clarify the exact requirements of a system. { Help to detect mistakes and errors early. { Make it possible to prove properties about a system. { Make it possible to prove the correctness of an implementation.
We present a formal speci cation of the core of one of the components of the Tosca smart card system as it is currently being developed by Integrity Arts Inc. It is our aim to demonstrate in this paper the bene ts of using a formal approach in a setting that is accessible to an audience that is not specialised in Formal Methods.
We give a detailed speci cation of the core of the proprietary systems programming language Clasp (Compact Language for Abstract Secure Processors) that plays a key role in the Tosca system. The Clasp language is designed for secure execution and to generate a dense object code. The security aspects of the language will be highlighted in this paper, space precludes us from exploring its density properties.
Formal speci cations of languages are not novel. An excellent introduction to the subject may be found in Nielson and Nielson 10] . To our knowledge formal speci cations as described in this book have not been used to help design and reason about smart card systems. This is the rst contribution of this paper. The second contribution is that we indicate how a formal speci cation may be used to help develop support tools for the development process of a smart card system. We identify tools such as emulators, simulators and animators and give a code fragment from our simulator. The key role of a formal speci cation in producing these support tools is explained.
In the next section, we discuss the general design of the Tosca system as a layered software architecture. In Section 3, we present an informal description of the core of Clasp, which is then followed by a formal speci cation. Section 4 describes how properties of the formal speci cation can be formulated and proved. It also describes how tools can be built to create the structural parts of simulators, emulators, animators and the actual implementation of components of a smart card system. This section also includes future work. Section 5 describes related work and the nal section presents our conclusions.
A Layered Software Architecture
Programs in smart cards are usually stored in ROM. This ensures that the programs cannot easily be tampered with. Unfortunately, this also makes smart cards in exible, because the ROM cannot be changed after fabrication. To overcome this limitation, smart card operating systems need to support the downloading of executable code. To maintain the operating system integrity, the loadable executable code should be contained in recognizable sections of application code 11, 1], which are usually referred to as`applets'. In Tosca, the applet code is executed by a carefully crafted interpreter that makes sure that the applet code behaves properly. Later, we make more precise what`proper behaviour' means. The provision of a downloadable applet facility makes smart cards exible, without hampering the security.
The same idea has been used to build exible Web browsers using Java 6] . Java enables applets to be downloaded from the server and to be executed by the client browser. Java code is compiled by the server into a byte code, which is subsequently interpreted. The Java interpreter can check that the downloaded applets behave properly.
A smart card is not a Web browser, so that although in principle similar approaches can be followed, the practice is di erent. For one thing, smart cards are small. Web browsers may assume that there are megabytes of memory available. The specially designed Tosca smart card application language is to smart cards what Java is to the Web browser: application code in Tosca is compiled into loadable applets.
To cope with the limitations of smart cards, the Tosca interpreter is itself written in an interpreted code, called Clasp. This increases the code density and improves the level of trust beyond what is possible with a single level of interpretation. The time penalty incurred by using multiple levels of interpretation is not a problem for smart cards. A typical smart card transaction lasts for about one second and the only compute intensive aspect is associated with the cryptography. By coding the compute intensive parts of cryptographic operations at the lowest level (directly in machine code), and by making these operations available as instructions at a higher level of interpretation, smart card systems can be e cient and secure. Multiple levels of interpretation are standard practice in computer architecture 14]. A typical CISC machine would have a micro code program that interprets machine instructions. The operating system would interpret system calls, and a user program (such as the command language interpreter) might interpret a further set of instructions. The point here is that the problems that smart card software architects are facing can be solved using tried and tested ideas such as the multi level abstract machine and client/server approaches.
Tosca's multi-layered software architecture is schematically shown in Figure 1 . The Tosca development environment allows for the creation of trustable smart card applications on the basis of the Tosca operating system, standard applets and customer applets. The Tosca language is used to create the applets. Tosca applets are compiled into Tosca-object, which is then interpreted by the Tosca-object interpreter.
The Tosca-object interpreter is written in Clasp, as are the standard library modules that are supplied with this interpreter. The Clasp language is a threaded code, interpreted language. It has been designed speci cally for the provision of trustable code. It can be compiled into a dense and e cient interpreted code called Clasp-object.
Clasp-object interpreters are small assembler programs, written speci cally for typical IC card processors, such as the 8051 and the 6805.
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on particular aspects of the Clasp language.
The Compact and Secure Clasp Language
The Clasp programming model is that of a stack machine. It works in the same way as FORTH in that it shares with FORTH the ability to extend the language. However, unlike FORTH, Clasp provides security and dense code, but does not support compiled routines and run-time dictionary lookup.
A Clasp program consists of a number of declarations, of which we shall only discuss the procedure declarations. Each procedure has a name and a body, there are no explicit parameters to the procedures. Arguments are passed implicitly via the stack. Return values are left on the stack. This makes programming in Clasp a bit awkward, but Clasp extensions have been developed to help overcome this limitation. A future extended de nition of the language is under construction to provide syntactic support in this aspect. We shall not discuss these extensions here, and we shall not even look at procedure calls. Instead, we will focus on how the body of a procedure is executed. A body consists of a number of control statements and stack operators. Constructs are separated by semi-colons as in Pascal. The control statements and the stack operators communicate exclusively via the stack. The stack is kept in the RAM of the smart card, which therefore limits the amount of space that can be used for the stack.
Let us concentrate on the basic mode of operation of the Clasp interpreter: it executes one statement or stack operator at a time, manipulating the stack as appropriate. Some important types of Clasp statements and operators are: { The operators: ?, < replace the top two elements of the stack by a newly computed result. This summary description shows two things. First, the Clasp language may seem rather a poor language. We should point out that we have not shown the complete language. For instance, I/O and memory operations and in particular the loop construct and procedures have not been described. We do not need those for the example that we will be discussing in detail. Furthermore, the description of these concepts is not di cult to add. Adding loops and procedures does not increase the number of di erent language constructs signi cantly. The complete language is kept small and focussed which makes it easier to build language processors and to reason about programs written in the language.
The second point to make is that the summary description above is also vague in many ways. This is typical for informal language descriptions. It may be a source of considerable frustration both to the compiler writer and to the programmer, as neither knows exactly what the language designer intended, and problems created by such vagueness are in general di cult to address. In a trusted environment this vagueness cannot be tolerated, and a formal description of the programming language is called for.
The Syntax of a Representative Subset of Clasp
The syntax of a programming language is usually described with a formal language, e.g. based on BNF, or the pictorial form of BNF: syntax diagrams. By using appropriately chosen names for the describing rules, the syntax may indicate what particular language constructs mean. It does not enforce that meaning, the names serve only as a suggestion. The formal semantics of the language, dened in addition to the syntax, is to provide that. Working with a semantics may seem di cult and mathematical at rst, because of the use of special symbols. Once adapted to the particular notation, using formal methods feels like programming. Figure 2 shows the abstract syntax of the subset of Clasp as described earlier.
The syntactic category n represents numbers and s (and also s 1 , s 2 , s t and s f ) represent statements and stack operators. It is customary to use an abstract rather than a concrete syntax for reasons of brevity. The di erence between the two forms of syntax is that in an abstract syntax parentheses indicate how constructs are parsed. In a concrete syntax this information is encoded in the rules, which are therefore slightly more complicated. This rule encoded parsing information is not relevant for the description of the meaning of the constructs, and can be safely ignored.
Here is an example of a Clasp code fragment, with parentheses to enforce a correct parse: s = 5; (3; (2; (pickn; (2; (pickn; (<; test skip else 2; rotn end)))))) (1) It is possible to check that the statement above satis es the syntactic requirements of Clasp. The meaning of the code fragment can only be guessed, which is not satisfactory. The next section introduces the formal aspects of describing the meaning of a code fragment such as that of (1). 3 Towards a Formal Description of the Clasp Subset.
In this section, the execution of the statement sequence in Clasp is presented and explained using English and diagrams (section 3.1). Semantic rules are introduced (section 3.2) and the derivation sequence of the Clasp example is presented (section 3.3). The rules are modi ed and extended with the statement composition rules (section 3.4). Finally, tags are added to distinguish between correct and incorrect behaviour (section 3.5). Tables 2 and 3 summarise the nal rules.
The application of formal rules makes an execution trace more readable, reduces ambiguity inherent to vagueness and makes a language description compact.
Executing a Clasp Statement Sequence.
This section presents the execution of a Clasp statement sequence using English and diagrams. It will show how elaborate an explanation can become when using these techniques instead of formal methods used later on.
Consider the statement sequence (1) again:
5; 3; 2; pickn; 2; pickn; <; test skip else 2; rotn end (2) The sequence consists of 8 statements separated by the operator ; . Brackets are omitted, for we assume the sequence is interpreted from left to right. All successive stack con gurations in the computation are shown in gure 3. The stack grows downwards. Indexes of the elements are given to the right of the stack. The rst statement in the sequence pushes the number 5 onto the stack (b). The execution of the next two statements results in the numbers 3 (c) and 2 respectively pushed onto the stack (d). After these steps, the sequence of statements is reduced to pickn; 2; pickn; <; test skip else 2; rotn end (3) The statement pickn pops the stack, updates the index (e), and pushes a copy of the element with the index given by the popped element, that is, index 2, value 5 (f). The execution continues by pushing a 2 onto the stack (g). Again, the pickn statement pops the stack and updates the index (h). It pushes a copy of the element with index 2 (the popped element) onto the stack, i.e. the number 3 (i).
The next statement, < , compares the top two elements of the stack. It pushes a 0 (representing false) onto the stack if the top element (with index 1) is greater than or equal to the element with index 2, otherwise it pushes a 1 (representing true). In this case < pushes a 0 for 56 <3 (j). The sequence of statements is now reduced to test skip else 2; rotn end (4) The test statement resembles an if: : :then: : :else construct, but it has no boolean expression. Instead, the boolean on which the decision is based as to which branch to take, must have been pushed onto the stack before a test statement is encountered. The < statement in the sequence can be considered as the boolean expression in an if: : :then: : :else construct. The test statement inspects the top of the stack, nds a 0, pops it and subsequently executes the statements after the else. It results in stack con guration (k) and the sequence (2;rotn) to be
(1)
(1) The execution of the sequence 2; pickn; 2; pickn; <; test skip else 2; rotn end (5) will result in a stack with its top element larger than or equal to the element with index 2.
3.2 Introducing the Formal Rules.
Instead of using pictures to illustrate the con guration of the stack and using The concatenation (statement; statements) de nes a sequence of statements, in which statement is the rst statement. It is followed by the sequence statements. Just as n is used to denote any number and s to denote any sequence of statements, u (user stack) is used to denote any stack con guration (including the empty stack). The stack grows from right to left, and stack elements are concatenated using the operator : . The symbol ; explicitly indicates the empty stack. The notation speci es the empty statement sequence.
Consider the rule for the statement n: hn; s; ui ) hs; n : ui (6) The rule states that the execution of the statement n followed by the statements s, with stack con guration u, results in a new state in which statements s are to be executed with the new stack con guration n : u. Here n is the new top. As an example consider the execution of the rst three statements of sequence (2) in section 3.1: h5; 3; 2; ;i ) h3; 2; 5 : ;i ) h2; 3 : 5 : ;i ) h ; 2 : 3 : 5 : ;i (7) This derivation sequence shows three successive applications of rule (6) . The numbers 5, 3 and 2 are pushed onto the stack respectively, resulting in the nal stack con guration 2 : 3 : 5 : ;, in which 2 is the top of the stack and has index 1. All statements are executed. Note that a statement can always be followed by the empty statement (sequence) , i.e. statement statement; , in which means semantically equivalent. This implies that can be omitted. In (7), for instance, 5; 3; 2 5; 3; 2; . There is no particular reason for omitting , other than saving space.
A rule's left-hand side is viewed as a template to which the statement sequence to be executed is matched. The semantics is thus syntax directed. The starting state in (7), h5; 3; 2; ;i, and the left-hand side of the rule (6), hn; s; ui, can be matched by considering n = 5, s = 3; 2, and u = ;. Applying the rule results in the state h3; 2; 5 : ;i. Note that 2 2; is used to match 2 in h2; 3 : 5 : ;i of (7) with the statement sequence n; s in rule (6).
The rule for the statement pickn is given by hpickn; s; n : ui ) hs; u n] : ui (8) The top of the stack on the left-hand side of the rule, n, is used as an index in the stack u. u n] is the element in the stack with index n and replaces n as the top of the stack.
Consider the following example of using pickn:
hpickn; 1 : 3 : 5i ) h ; 3 : 3 : 5i When n = 2, the rule de nes a swap function, as was shown in section 3.1. The rule precisely de nes the behaviour of the statement rotn for all n (i.e. for all 'correct' n, for stack under ow and over ow are not taken into account, yet).
As an example, consider: hrotn The rules introduce the notion of a precondition, or premise. A premise is a condition on the transition, i.e. the transition can only take place if the premise is true. The premise is written above the horizontal line and the actual transition from state to state, or derivation step, is written below it. By writing b : u as the stack con guration on the rules' left-hand sides, the top of the stack, b, can be used in the premise. If b = 1, the rule named (test True ) matches, execution continues by executing s t ; s. If b = 0, rule (test False ) is applied, and the sequence s f ; s is to be executed. The rules are mutually exclusive but not complete, as the behaviour in case b > 1 is not de ned. This will be amended in section 3.5, but for now, it is assumed that the boolean b is either 0 or 1.
The statement < also has two possible execution paths. Depending on the outcome of the comparison of the top two elements of the stack, either a 0 or a 1 is pushed onto the stack. Having already introduced the notion of a premise, the rules for the statement < are included (see table 1 ) without further explanation.
The rule for the statement skip is given by hskip; s; ui ) hs; ui (12) The execution of skip does not a ect the stack. If a test statement was to be de ned with only one execution path, for instance, skip can be used to constitute the empty statement sequence as the other path. The derivation sequence contains all semantically relevant information in only 11 formal lines. It shows each con guration of the stack and what statements are left to be executed. The derivation sequence shows at least two of the advantages of using formal rules instead of English and pictures, namely compactness and clarity. Compactness and clarity help to make precise the behaviour of an execution or system, and therefore help to detect mistakes and errors.
Adding the Composition Rules.
In section 3.2, the general form of a rule was de ned as follows:
hstatement; statements; stacki ) hstatements; stack 0 i, i.e. after executing statement, and perhaps changing the stack, statements are left to be executed.
The rst statement is of interest, but also the fact that statements follow it (though not their precise contents). A di erent approach from the one used in section 3.2 is to only concentrate on the individual statements. This allows for separation of concerns, bearing in mind the principle \if you can separate then separate". Sequencing and the actual computation are the two concerns here. Separation of the two will lead to shorter derivations and it is more extensible.
The rule for the statement n has been given by hn; s; ui ) hs; n : ui. It is now de ned as: hn; ui ) h ; n : ui. Hence, we are no longer concerned with the statements that follow n. The nal table of section 3 summarises the adapted rules (with tags to be introduced in section 3.5).
A mechanism is needed for the newly de ned rules to be applied to a sequence of statements as before. For this purpose, two composition rules are introduced: In the simpli ed rules of section 3.2, statements could be empty ( ). This was a necessity, for hstatement; statementsi would otherwise always be an endless statement sequence. However, if s 0 1 = in the rule (; step ), the premises of the two composition rules are exactly the same and one state, namely hs 1 ; s 2 ; ui, has two possible transitions! The new form hstatement; stacki allows us to go back to our original syntax de nition in section 2.2 which excludes the possibility of statement being empty. Now, is the only possible empty statement sequence.
To summarise, rules are now of the form hstatement; stacki ) h ; stack 0 i, and the composition rules were added to be able to reason about a sequence of statements. We have separated sequencing from doing the stack operations.
Adding tags.
So far, it was assumed that statements that a ect the stack can always be executed. In an implementation, this cannot be assumed. When using a stack, two kinds of errors may occur: stack over ow and stack under ow. The rst occurs when a statement pushes data onto a full stack, or when the stack is addressed with an index that is larger than its size. Here, (number) is the only rule that pushes data onto the stack. Several other rules may use an`incorrect' index. A mechanism is needed to trap this error. The other error, stack under ow, occurs when an empty stack is popped, or when the stack is addressed with an index less than 1. Several rules may cause this error by using an`incorrect' index. The rule (<) compares the top two elements of the stack, but what happens when the stack is only one element large or even empty? A mechanism must be present to handle these errors, for rules must always be precise.
For this purpose, the notion of a tag is introduced, and each state is extended with a tag. Consequently, the general form of the rules is: hstatement; stack; oki ) h ; stack 0 ; tagi, in which tag is either ok or nok (not ok). Note that the tag on the left-hand side is always ok. If tag = nok in the current state, no rule should match, for, in that case, an error has occurred and execution should be stopped (an exception handling mechanism is provided in Clasp, but limitation of space precludes us from explaining that here).
The execution of statement n is now de ned by two rules: one de ning its behaviour when no stack over ow will occur, and one de ning it when it will: juj < max hn; u; oki ) h ; n : u; oki (number ok ) juj max hn; u; oki ) h ; u; nok full i (number full )
Here, juj is the number of elements in the stack. If this number is greater or equal to a certain prede ned number max which denotes the maximum stack size, rule (number full ) applies, and the tag is set to nok. The subscript full is used to distinguish between di erent kinds of errors. If juj < max, the statement is executed as before, i.e. n is pushed, and the tag is not changed. Note that the two rules are complete, which is a requirement when proving properties (section 4.1).
In section 3.2, the value b used in the premise of the two test rules was assumed to be either 0 or 1. The two rules are mutually exclusive, but not complete. We now have a mechanism with which it is possible to add another rule to replace the ad-hoc assumption, and that is to be used when b > 1 The other two rules, (test True ) and (test False ), are as before, maintaining the ok-status, and are included in the two nal tables, tables 2 and 3. Note that juj 1 is not included in the premises of these two rules. The construction b : u explicitly denotes that there is at least one element in the stack.
In the pickn statement, n is used as an index in the stack. The simpli ed rule (pickn) is now extended with a premise to only match when the index n is`correct'. Two rules are added to de ne the transitions to error states (see tables 2 and 3).
The form of the rules introduced in section 3.4 makes the rules more extensible than the form of the simpli ed rules introduced in section 3.2. If we had extended the simpli ed rules with the tags, tables 2 and 3 would be twice as big. We would have had to de ne the behaviour of statements in hstatement; statementsi for every possible execution of statement. Tables 2 and 3 summarise all the rules with the tags and the composition rules added. Note that the tag nok x in the premise of the composition rule (; nok ) is used to pass the tag nok with the message empty, full or errb (hence the x) to the transition below the horizontal line. 4 Using the Formal Description.
We have discussed the formal description of the subset of the Clasp language. The rules precisely describe, in a clear and compact way, what happens in a normal situation and in case some error occurs (proper behaviour). In this section, this formal description is used. First, it will be shown how it can be used to prove properties of the language. In the second part, a more general view is given on using the formal description in building support tools for the software development process.
Proving Properties.
Security is an important aspect of a smart card system. Runtime errors like stack over ow, stack under ow and non-determinism of code impinge on the security. Trust can be gained by proving that these errors will not occur, or that if they do, they will be dealt with. The formal rules allow for such proofs. Since the rules are precisely the formal speci cation of the language Clasp, properties proven using the rules are properties proven for Clasp programs.
All proofs follow the same strategy 10] (this still holds when the subset is extended with loop constructs): prove that the property holds for all derivation sequences of length 0. Then prove the property holds for all other derivation sequences: assume that the property holds for all derivation sequences of length at most k (this is the induction hypothesis) and show that it holds for derivation sequences of length k + 1. Now, it is proven that stack over ow will not occur, i.e. execution continues if execution of the current statement will not cause the stack to over ow, and execution is stopped with the tag set to nok if it does.
Assumption: execution is started with jstackj max. Throughout the proof stack is used to denote any stack, and, as before, max is used to denote the maximum stack size. case k = 0: The property jstackj max still holds, for if no statements are executed, jstackj max holds by the initial assumption. 2 case k + 1: Every possible statement to be executed as the (k + 1)-th statement The property is now proven for all possible statements to be executed next. This nishes the proof for case k + 1. Because k can be any natural number, the property is proven for any sequence length. 2
The above proof constitutes an informal proof, in the sense that it does not use any formal notation as is used in a formal proof. It is just as thorough though.
It was proven that the error stack over ow will be dealt with. A similar proof can be given for the error stack under ow. Instead of ensuring that jstackj max holds all the time, it must be ensured that jstackj 0 holds all the time. Execution is started with jstackj 0 (assumption). As an example, consider the subcase for statement rotn. Using the induction hypothesis, jstackj 0 holds when encountering a statement rotn. Suppose that jstackj = 0, and popping an element will cause stack under ow. This situation is intercepted by rule (rotn empty ). Apart from ensuring that there is a rule that matches, it also needs to be ensured that there is no other rule that matches. Indeed this is the case, for it can immediately be seen that the other rules all write their starting stack con guration as n : u, i.e. at least one element on the stack. The other possibility to cause stack under ow is when n is`not right', i.e. n < 2, for at least two elements will be needed in order to do a rotation. Here, rule (rotn nok ) matches, which also traps the possibility of n > jstackj. Note that the two premises of (rotn nok ) do not have to be included in the rule (rotn empty ). The only other possibility left is that n is`right'. In this situation, only rule (rotn ok ) matches. Note also that the premise juj 1 need not be added. If juj 1 then n would have to be either 0 or 1, because n juj is also part of the premise. The premise n 2 would not be true, and using the boolean construct the premise as a whole would not be true.
In a similar way, other properties that are important to smart card software can be proven. Determinism of the language is such a property. A formal proof is not given here. Informally, one should prove that every possible execution for every possible statement has one, and only one, matching rule that de nes its behaviour. This is not di cult to prove for the subset of the Clasp language, i.e. the rules in tables 2 and 3. For instance, the rules for the statement n de ne the only two possible executions, and they are mutually exclusive. Again, induction can be used to prove the property for compound statements.
New rules or new restrictions in the language can also be de ned. Consider, for instance, the possibility of byte over ow. The only statement that pushes a number onto the stack, namely n, can not cause over ow, for 0 n 255 by de nition. The statement < also deals with bytes, for it compares two bytes.
The rules, however, de ne its behaviour: either a 0 or a 1 is pushed onto the stack. So, < will not cause any problems. Of course, the inequality operators use arithmetic operators, and these operators should also be`checked'. Our subset of Clasp has ? as its only arithmetic operator, so, this is the only operator that needs to be looked at. We now do the reverse of what we did before: we design a rule for this arithmetic operator, in such a way, that it will behave correctly. The rules can be de ned as: Rule (? ok ) simply ignores byte over ow by using the mod function. An alternative approach is to generate an exception (Clasp includes exception handling, but it is not shown here). The point here is that any rule can be de ned, and a choice must be made when designing a language.
Tool Support
A formal speci cation can play an important role in the software engineering process. Figure 4 identi es the major`components' in the process. We use the term component here as a general term for such diverse items as the concepts on which a system is designed, the speci cation of the system, and also the documentation, implementation and`derived components'. The latter include various tools, such as simulators of the system. Figure 4 shows only some of the many relationships between the components. For example the connection between concept and speci cation represents an iterative process of design and redesign. The connection between speci cation and derived components represents program generation tools and also programming and design e orts.
A formal description of the subset of the Clasp language has been given and its use demonstrated. This is just one component of the software for smart cards. Any system is as weak as its weakest component so there is a need for formally specifying the complete Clasp language, and also Tosca, the compilers, the interpreters and the assembler. Then we can begin to reason about the system as a whole. We have formally speci ed a substantial part of the Clasp language, its compiler and interpreter. Currently we are working on the speci cation of Tosca and on completing the Clasp speci cations. Work on the components should be supported by adequate tools, which basically take as input the speci cation and produce as output a derived component. The following are useful derived components, which implement all or part of the functional behaviour of the component. The non-functional behaviour (that is how much resources are being used) of the derived components is generally di erent from the non-functional behaviour of the component itself.
{ An animator implements the functional behaviour as speci ed, and supports interaction. The key feature of an animator is that it allows the user to inspect and even change data whilst the data is being processed. { A simulator implements the functional behaviour as speci ed, or an abstraction of the behaviour, and supports statistics gathering like timing. { An emulator implements precisely the functional behaviour as speci ed, and is often used as a prototype. These de nitions are not static, and vary considerably across di erent elds of computer science.
Tool support is necessary to keep the development of these derived components, the speci cation, the documentation and the testing and veri cation procedures, and the real component in step. Figure 4 shows the relationships between all the relevant parts in the development process.
A formal speci cation in the style that we have presented in the previous section is abstract in the sense that it only deals with the functional behaviour. At the same time it is detailed because it describes precisely what should happen in a normal situation and also in case some error has occurred. Our formal specication can thus serve as a starting point for building the derived components as well as the real implementation. The programming activity involved should be mainly concerned with choosing the right programming language and with creating the non-functional behaviours desired for the derived and real components. The functional behaviour is always the same.
We have built a simple tool to generate the major part of the animator from our Clasp speci cation. The animator is written in the functional programming language Miranda The structures statement, stack and tag correspond to the statements s, the stack u and the tag ok=nok of the speci cation of tables 2 and 3. The function test corresponds to the four rules (test empty ), (test errb ), (test True ) and (test False ).
Without going into the detail of the C fragment, we can see that the structure of the function re ects that of the four rules from the speci cation. The rst conditional makes sure that the test statement is only executed if the tag is ok.
The next conditional, checks whether the stack contains at least one element. If this is the case, the nal conditionals distinguish between the case that the boolean value b on the top of the stack represents a non-boolean value, true or false.
The result of executing the test statement is recorded by modifying the structures that are passed to the function test. This is the only major di erence between the speci cation and the simulator. It represents our e orts to make the simulator run fast, whilst maintaining the appropriate functional behaviour.
Related work
An approach similar to ours in the domain of building a high integrity compiler is described by Stepney 12] . Her compiler is for a small general purpose language, which by coincidence is also called Tosca.
Much work has been done to develop formal methods speci cally for reasoning about protocols. The speci cation formalism LOTOS is widely used in this area. The protocols that are used in smart card systems could also be modelled using formalisms such as LOTOS but we do not know whether that has been done. The work at GMD 3, 9] uses a Petri net based method to perform model checking on the protocols used in the STARCOS and STARMOD systems 13].
In our own previous work, we have looked at the modelling of a smart card protocol with a view to proving liveness of that protocol 7]. We have recently built an animation system 5] for the protocols that are de ned in the CEN European standard Inter Sector electronic purse 2]. This work explores the use of the visual programming language Prograph 4] as an animation support system. The connection between a formal speci cation of the protocols and the production of the animation is still to be made. 6 
Conclusions
Using a formal approach to building trustworthy software is not widely practiced in the smart card community. This is to some extent surprising: the reason why smart cards are used is because they rely on cryptographic protocols. Cryptology is a branch of mathematics that is devoted to proving properties of cryptographic algorithms and protocols. In practice, when it comes to implementing these protocols in smart cards, the attention shifts to more technical issues, such as getting the implementation to work and making it work with limited resources, leaving correctness assurance aside.
We have shown that formal methods can pro tably be used to build trustworthy components for a smart card system. Our main argument is that smart cards are tiny, and so the languages used to program the software components should be highly focussed and small. This makes it feasible to specify such languages formally. Programs written in such languages have a well-de ned meaning. They are therefore amenable to formal reasoning. We have shown how properties can be proved, when given a small subset of the language that plays an important rôle in our smart card system. However, the methods used can be applied to any language or system. We have discussed the necessity of tool support in smart card software engineering. By giving a sample component of a simulator we have shown how formal rules can be used to help build suitable tools.
